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Much of the commentary on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has focused on the
nature of power that agencies exercise when they promulgate rules that
merit judicial deference under Chevron. Some scholars view Chevron as
reading into statutes an implied delegation from Congress to agencies of
legislative power to fill statutory gaps and interpret statutory ambiguities.
Other scholars understand Chevron as, in effect, a delegation of
interpretive power from the courts to agencies.
This Article argues that neither view of Chevron is correct. Chevron
purports to command deference beyond what would be required if
Chevron merely stated a rule for the allocation of judicial power to
interpret statutes. Conversely, Chevron deference cannot always rest upon
an implied grant of legislative power from Congress, even where the
agency exercises validly delegated rulemaking authority and promulgates
a rule that satisfies the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In particular, where the statute contains an ambiguity rather than a gap, it
is not a rational principle of statutory interpretation to view the statute as
authorizing a delegation of legislative rulemaking authority as a way to
resolve the ambiguity-ambiguities impliedly call for interpretation, not
legislation. Accordingly, even on the most expansive reading of Chevron,
deference cannot always rest on an implied congressional delegation of
legislative authority; in certain circumstances it must rest on an implied
delegation ofjudicial authority.
This conclusion suggests that agency reversals of prior rules that
resolve statutory ambiguities should merit substantially less deference
than do rules promulgated de novo. Such reduced deference would be
based on the same principles that prevent courts from lightly abandoning
precedent. The conclusion also raises questions about the policy
justifications of Chevron in the first place. If the resolution of statutory
ambiguity is fundamentally an exercise of judicial power, the question of
the scope of deference should turn on the court's evaluation of who is best
situated to interpret. This evaluation requires an examination of
contextually variable factors that is irreconcilable with Chevron's rule of
deference.
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Introduction
In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,'
the Supreme Court established a new standard for judicial review of
agency rules that interpret provisions of statutes the agencies administer.
This standard requires the court to determine, as a threshold matter,
whether the statute speaks "to the precise question at issue."2 If it does,
then the court is to apply ordinary canons of statutory construction to
determine statutory meaning and eschew reliance on administrative
interpretation. If the statute does not address the precise question at issue,
courts determine, in a second step,3 whether the agency's rule represents a
reasonable construction of the statute. If it does, then the court must defer
to the agency's interpretation; if not, the court interprets the statute on its
own.
4
In the sixteen years since Chevron was decided, its rule of deference
has been the subject of on-going scholarly debate, much of it centering on
the rule's statutory and constitutional underpinnings.' This Article
1 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2 Id. at 842.
3 Hereinafter referred to as "step two" or "Chevron step two."
4 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
5 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 84 (1994) (noting the disagreement
among Chevron commentators on the propriety and scope of the Chevron doctrine).
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contributes to the debate by focusing on the relevance of the type of
statutory deficiency that an administrative rule attempts to remedy to the
Chevron step-two analysis. 6 Although Chevron in essence conflated the
cases of statutory ambiguity and statutory gap, I argue that the basis for
judicial deference in the two instances differs. Whereas an agency's gap-
filling rule may be understood as an exercise of congressionally delegated
lawmaking authority, resolution of statutory ambiguity may not.
Irrespective of the procedure by which an agency promulgates its rule, the
nature of statutory ambiguity does not authorize a presumption that
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to legislate under the
statute on the point in question. In other words, the resolution of statutory
ambiguity implicates the agency in statutory interpretation, an activity that
Congress may delegate to agencies but over which Congress lacks the
power to command deference from the courts. For this reason, judicial
deference in this instance must rest on a basis different from an implied
congressional command. This Article identifies as that basis the
independent decision of the courts to vest agencies with final interpretive
power. In effect, Chevron represents a delegation of judicial power to
agencies in the case of rules that resolve statutory ambiguity.
This focus on the distinct bases of judicial deference has at least two
important implications for judicial application of Chevron. First, it
indicates that a blanket rule of deference to reasonable agency
interpretations at Chevron's step two is inappropriate. In certain instances
deference will be appropriate if, and only if, the agency has exercised
delegated legislative authority. Where the statutory defect cannot logically
be understood to support such a delegation, deference must give way to
Opinion is divided between commentators who support Chevron's expansive deference policy
and those who oppose it. Compare, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (supporting Chevron's rule of deference), and Cass
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990) (same), with
Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron
Era, 32 B.C. L. REv. 757, 759-64, 786-815 (1991) (opposing Chevron as an invasion of the judiciary's
Article III power to interpret law), and Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989) (same).
6 See infra Part II for a discussion of the difference between gaps and ambiguities. Simply
stated, a gap typically occurs in one of two instances. First, the statute literally may be silent on the
precise question at issue, providing no guidance whatsoever. More commonly, the statute may contain
a term that is undefined and clearly susceptible to a multiplicity of meanings.
7 Other commentators have argued that Chevron embodies a principle of judicial self-
restraint rather than one of legislative allocation or inherent executive authority to interpret the law.
See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A
New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
1275, 1278 ("Chevron's rule of required deference is better understood as a judicially self-imposed,
prudential limitation on the federal courts' interpretive authority."); Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 5, at
821-27 (arguing that Chevron is incompatible with an independent judiciary and that it represents an
unwise limitation by the judiciary of its own power). None has suggested, however, that the basis for
judicial deference to administrative rulemaking hinges on the nature of the statutory defect the rule
addresses.
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more searching judicial review. Second, the focus on the basis of
deference highlights the ultimately interpretive character of much agency
rulemaking, notwithstanding that such rulemaking frequently is legislative
in form. As I argue in Part III, because the relative capacity of courts and
agencies to interpret the law inevitably hinges on contextually variable
factors, Chevron's blanket rule of deference is flawed because it precludes
an efficient allocation of "interpretive resources."
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Court's
opinion in Chevron, explains the differences between legislative and
interpretative rules that undergird the opinion, and briefly sets forth the
pre- and post-Chevron doctrine on judicial deference. The emphasis in this
part is on agency reinterpretations of their governing statutes, because the
nature of the power exercised by an agency--quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial-is decisive for purposes of determining the extent of
constitutionally permissible judicial deference to agency rules that
reinterpret earlier rules.8 Part II then explores the doctrinal basis of the
Chevron rule. Here, the focus is not on the policy justifications for
Chevron, but on the outer limits of judicial deference consistent with
established separation of powers principles. I examine the basic
differences between legislative gaps and ambiguities and then draw on this
analysis to explain the basis for differing sources of agency power to
promulgate rules. Finally, Part II uses the analytical framework developed
in Parts I and II to show that Chevron represents bad policy, apart from the
constitutional difficulties it faces.
I. Judicial Deference Before and After Chevron
A. Chevron v. NRDC
Chevron involved the proper interpretation of the term "stationary
source" as used in section 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act (the Act)9
following its amendment by The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (the
Amendments).' ° Under the Amendments, states that had failed to achieve
pollution reduction targets mandated under the Act (non-attainment states)
were required to limit the output of pollutants by stationary sources located
within the states to certain specified levels. The Act, both prior to and
8 But see David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 682 n.6 (1997) (arguing that deference analysis
under Chevron should not depend on whether the rule is an initial agency interpretation or
reinterpretation).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
10 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
330
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following the Amendments, did not define the term "stationary source" for
purposes of measuring pollutants. Prior to 1981, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the agency charged with administering the Act,
had promulgated a rule that defined "stationary source" as, in essence, a
single pollution-emitting facility for this purpose. By contrast, the EPA
applied a plantwide definition, or "bubble concept," of "stationary source"
in the case of pollution sources located in states that generally had
demonstrated progress in reducing air pollution emissions to the levels
mandated by the Act. Under the bubble concept, the amount of pollution
emitted by a particular facility within a plant could increase as long as the
increase was offset by a concomitant reduction in pollution emitted by one
or more other facilities in the same plant.
In 1981, the EPA promulgated a new rule that adopted the bubble
concept of "stationary source" for all pollution sources, irrespective of
whether the source was located in a non-attainment state. A number of
environmental groups brought suit, challenging the EPA's new rule as
violative of the Amendments. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
sitting in review of the EPA, agreed with the plaintiffs and overturned the
EPA's new rule." The court first examined the Clean Air Act to determine
whether it defined the technical term "stationary source." After concluding
that the statutory language was unavailing and its legislative history was
"at best contradictory," the court conducted an independent review of the
purposes of the Act and found that the EPA's definition of "source"
violated the statute's "raison d'etre," which was to improve air quality.12
The Supreme Court reversed. In a 6-0 opinion 13 authored by Justice
Stevens, the Court ratified the EPA's rule as a reasonable interpretation of
the statutory language. The Court also reproached the D.C. Circuit for
substituting its own policy analysis for the EPA's, stating that "[t]he basic
legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition
of the term 'stationary source' when it decided that Congress itself had not
commanded that definition.' 4 The Court then enunciated its view of the
task faced by a court reviewing any agency's interpretation of its
governing statute:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
11 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12 See id. at 726.
13 Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not participate in the decision. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
14 Id. at 842.
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issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
15
Chevron, of course, worked something of a revolution in
administrative law-at least at the level of perception.1 6 As explained in
greater detail below, one effect of Chevron's replacement of the variable
judicial deference that had been applied to agencies' legislative rules with
a blanket rule of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous or silent statutes has been to grant agencies vastly greater
discretion in resolving statutory ambiguity.
A second effect of Chevron has been to call into question the vitality
of the principle that final interpretive authority over federal law rests with
the judiciary. 7 Chevron threatens this principle in at least two respects.
First, to the extent it commits the task of statutory interpretation to non-
judicial bodies that are not subject to plenary judicial review, Chevron
places final interpretive authority outside of the judicial branch. As I argue
below in Part II, this shift of interpretive authority takes place whenever
the following conditions are met. First, the agency rule is accorded
deference under Chevron; second, the rule represents an instance of
15 Id. at 84243 (footnotes omitted).
16 The jury is still out on the true extent of the Chevron "revolution." See Callahan, supra
note 7, at 1281 (arguing that on a prudential reading, Chevron remains consistent with long-standing
principles of judicial deference-no revolution); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990-93 (noting the decline in the Supreme Court's reliance on Chevron
and, within a set of cases that do rely on Chevron, the decline in the number reaching Chevron's step
two); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1058-59 (noting the weakening of the Chevron effect in
post-1986 years). But the perception is common among commentators that Chevron represented a
fundamental reworking of the distribution of powers among the three branches. See, e.g., Caust-
Ellenbogen, supra note 5, at 776 (stating that Chevron "redefined the terms of the judicial review
debate"); Farina, supra note 5, at 456-57 (arguing that Chevron defined deference "in a way that...
was far more extreme than earlier articulations of the model [ofjudicial deference] had been").
17 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). A number of commentators have
suggested that Chevron may effect a re-allocation of power among the branches of the federal
government. See, e.g., Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2229 (1997) (noting that Chevron step two "reverses another part of the institutional hierarchy
the Court had traditionally recognized"); see also Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency Is the
Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REv. 529, 540-41, 567 (1992) (suggesting that Chevron
makes agency interpretations comparable to precedent but that agencies nonetheless are free to change
their interpretations).
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interpretation rather than of legislation; and third, the rule is one that a
court would be precluded from announcing were it faced with the same
question in the absence of any underlying agency interpretation. More
commonly, however, the shift occurs simply because Chevron deprives the
courts of the power to interpret statutes in step-two cases except where the
agency's rule is unreasonable.
Second, Chevron deprives the courts of final interpretive authority by
transforming questions of statutory interpretation into policy questions best
suited to non-judicial resolution. This effect of Chevron is the direct result
of the Court's striking equation of "legislative" rulemaking under Chevron
with policymaking. 8 This characterization follows from the Court's tacit
acceptance of the view that legislative rulemaking represents an exercise
of delegated legislative authority. In general, "legislative" rules are those
promulgated according to the notice and comment procedures of § 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 19 These procedures require the
agency to publish the rule in proposed form in the Federal Register, to
invite oral and written comment on the rule by "interested persons" at a
hearing, and to incorporate in the final rules "a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose."2° Such rules have the force and effect of law as
long as they are authorized by statute.2' Statutorily authorized and validly
promulgated legislative rules are as insulated from judicial review as the
statutes that authorize them.
By contrast, interpretative rules, which do not have the force and
effect of law, generally need not be promulgated pursuant to the APA's
notice and comment procedures22 and do not have binding effect on the
agencies issuing them or on the courts. 3 Interpretative rules may include
general statements of policy or interpretations of particular statutory
provisions in specific factual settings and may be issued in a wide variety
of forms, including releases, announcements, notices, and similar
documents.24 Although not bound by validly issued interpretative rules,
courts generally accord deference to such rules according to the same
principles that courts formerly applied to agency rules generally.25
Under the view accepted by the Court in Chevron, an agency's rule
would appear to qualify as an act of delegated legislative authority without
18 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
19 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
20 Id. § 553(c).
21 See generally I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.2 (3d ed. 1994).
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
23 See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 21, § 6.3.
24 See 3 id. § 17.3 (listing the forms interpretative rules may take).
25 See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,424 (1977) (stating that non-legislative rules
typically receive "important but not controlling significance" from reviewing courts).
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regard to whether resolving the problem posed by the statute calls for
agency interpretation or legislation.26 The consequence of this formalism is
the aforementioned transformation of interpretive questions into policy
questions, because the notice and comment procedures are more likely to
employ the salient features of legislation than of interpretation. These
features include political bargaining among interest groups and the
comparative freedom to promulgate any rules that comport with statutory
purposes.27
B. Judicial Deference Prior to Chevron
Prior to Chevron, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 28 and its progeny
controlled federal courts' review of agency rulemaking. Skidmore held that
agency interpretations,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case [depends] upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give power to
persuade, if lacking power to control. 29
In addition to the Skidmore factors favoring deference, courts applying
Skidmore considered a number of factors favoring heightened scrutiny of
agency rules. Where, for instance, an agency's rule "flatly contradicted" its
prior rule, was of recent of vintage, or concerned a non-technical area
within the court's expertise, courts were less apt to defer to the rule.30 In
essence, the examination of each of these factors was designed to enable
the court to determine the relative expertise of courts and agencies, the
potential for agency bias, and the capacity of courts to familiarize
themselves with the factual circumstances of the subject of agency
26 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44(1984).
27 See id. at 865-66.
28 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
29 Id. at 140. See also Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 480 (1956) (accepting the Secretary
of Labor's definition of "area of production" in the Fair Labor Standards Act because the Secretary had
conducted an extensive analysis of the statutory framework and had made a "reasoned decision" on the
basis of analysis); NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (pre-Skidmore) (deferring to the
NLRB's interpretation of "employee" after noting that the statute had not defined the term).
30 See Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 1983).
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), refused to defer to
an agency decision on the "naked" question of law of whether an employee can be a foreman.
334
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regulations.3'
The comparatively small body of case law dealing with the specific
issue of agency reinterpretations confirmed the validity of the variable
deference approach of Skidmore. In American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,32 the Supreme Court faced the
question whether the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) could
require railroads to provide trailer-on-flatcar, or "piggy-back," service on
equal terms to motor and water contract and to common carriers. 3
Although the ICC's requirement of similar treatment reversed its long-
standing position, the Supreme Court sustained the new rule on the
grounds that the circumstances of rail transport had changed dramatically
and that "this kind of flexibility and adaptability to changing needs and
patterns of transportation is an essential part of the office of a regulatory
agency.,34 The Court stressed that it made "no judgment as to the policy
aspects of the Commission's action.
3 5
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,36 the Supreme Court applied the
same factors to overturn an agency reinterpretation. Gilbert concerned an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guideline
interpreting Title VII.37 The guideline stated that an employer's failure to
provide insurance for long-term disabilities arising from pregnancy
constituted a violation of Title VII. 31 In declining to defer, the Court
observed that the guideline "flatly contradict[ed]" the agency's earlier
position and for this reason "[did] not receive high marks when judged by
the standards enunciated in Skidmore. 39
Lower courts applied the Skidmore principles in a similar fashion. In
Hatch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),4 ° the D.C.
Circuit declined to defer to a FERC rule that changed the burden of proof
public utilities directors needed to meet to establish their independence; a
director had to establish independence as a prerequisite to holding two
31 See Weaver, supra note 17, at 531-32.
32 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
33 See id. at 400.
34 Id. at 416.
35 Id.; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (granting substantial
deference to an agency reversal that followed a "detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the
President," of the agency's administration of its governing statute).
36 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
37 See id. at 142.
38 See id. at 140-41.
39 Id. at 143; see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982)
(declining to treat the agency interpretation as a regulation where the agency had changed its position
several times, including during pendency of the instant litigation); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199
(1974) (declining to defer to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' restrictive definition of "residency" where a
prior, more expansive definition represented the Bureau's interpretation of statutory intent and
Congress had not amended the statute).
40 654 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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directorial positions simultaneously. The court stated that an "agency must
provide a reasoned explanation for any failure to adhere to its own
precedents," and held that the Commission's "sparse discussion of the new
standard" and "fleeting reference" to two cases that had applied the new
standard did not discharge its duty to explain the change of course.4'
Conversely, in NAACP v. FCC,42 the court faced a challenge to the FCC's
revocation of its rule requiring an evidentiary hearing for certain television
station applications. Determining that it was "satisfied both that the agency
was aware it was changing its views and ha[d] articulated permissible
reasons for that change, and also that the new position [was] consistent
with the law," the court upheld the new policy.
43
C. Chevron and After
As suggested above, the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v.
NRDC transformed the relationship between reviewing courts and agencies
interpreting their governing statutes; it "[s]wept aside [the] Skidmore
criteria for determining the extent of deference in favor of a dramatic
reformulation of the grounds for reviewing statutes." 44 In place of a
context-sensitive inquiry into deference factors, courts now were required
to fit the widely varying circumstances of agency rulemaking into
Chevron's rather rigid decision tree: Either Congress had spoken directly
to the issue, or it had not. If it had, the court was to interpret the statute on
its own; if not, then the court was to examine the agency's interpretation of
the statute. If that interpretation was reasonable, the court was to defer; if
not, the court would interpret on its own. In comparison with the Skidmore
rule of variable deference, Chevron's formalism vastly simplified the
inquiry reviewing courts were to conduct.
Although Chevron purported to simplify the courts' task, it raised as
many questions as it answered. Chevron itself involved a legislative rather
than an interpretative rule, and, because it concerned the interpretation of a
technical term, it addressed the case of statutory silence rather than
ambiguity. But the text of Justice Stevens's opinion said nothing about
these particulars, and Chevron's sweeping language accordingly has
occasioned a great deal of uncertainty as to the breadth of its application.
41 Id. at 834.
42 682 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
43 Id. at 998; see also Hatch, 654 F.2d at 834 (citing cases that hold that an agency may
alter past rulings and policies provided that a reasoned explanation is given); Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[A]n agency changing its course must
apply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed,
not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without
discussion it may cross the line from tolerably terse to intolerably mute.").
44 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 16, at 1024.
Vol. 17:327, 2000
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Courts have struggled with such questions as what constitutes statutory
ambiguity or silence,45 whether Chevron applies if the rule is interpretative
rather than legislative,46 whether it extends to agencies' interpretations of
their own jurisdiction,47 and whether and how principles of stare decisis
apply to administrative rules that conflict with pre-Chevron case law.
41
Among the questions Chevron left open was the extent to which
deference applied to agency reinterpretations of their governing statutes.
Chevron itself was a reinterpretation case, but, because it involved a
statutory gap, it did not raise many of the concerns courts typically express
over deference to agency reinterpretations. These concerns include the
increased likelihood of politicized or biased decision-making and the
possibility that agencies reinterpreting a statute are covertly engaging in
rulemaking that violates the statute.49 However, lower courts facing the
issue of deference to agency reinterpretations have tended to give Chevron
broad effect. Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District
Council of Laborers50 is illustrative.
Mesa Verde concerned the validity of National Labor Relations Board
regulations interpreting section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) which governed the power of parties to labor contracts to rescind
some or all of the terms of those contracts. The regulations in effect at the
time of Mesa Verde contradicted prior NLRB regulations that had been
approved by the Supreme Court as reasonable interpretations of section
45 Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987) (refusing to defer to a "pure
question of statutory construction"), with id. at 454-55 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that a pure
question of law is inappropriate for Chevron's step two).
46 Compare General Motors v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (relying on Chevron in a decision to defer to the EPA's interpretative rule), with id. at 1573
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (noting that the EPA's rule was interpretative rather than legislative and
applying the Skidmore factors). The fact that then-Judge Scalia joined Judge Wald's majority opinion
in Ruckelshaus is noteworthy. See also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990) (arguing that deference under Chevron generally
ought not extend to administrative rules not promulgated under the notice-and-comment procedure
applicable to legislative rulemaking under the APA).
47 Compare New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (holding deference to an agency "inappropriate" when the question concerns the agency's
interpretation of statutory provisions governing its jurisdiction), with Transpacific Westbound Rate
Agreement v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 951 F.2d 950, 952-54 (9th Cir. 1991) (deferring to the
FMC's determination that its jurisdiction extended to "mixed agreements"). See also Quincy .M.
Crawford, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency's
Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 957, 968-83 (1994) (arguing in favor of deference).
48 See generally Pierce, supra note 17, at 2248-58 (identifying Supreme Court and circuit
court cases addressing the relationship of administrative rules to conflicting judicial and administrative
precedent).
49 See. e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 n.25 (1975)
(according no special weight to an SEC guideline that conflicted with prior releases); see also
Seidenfeld, supra note 5, at 104-11 (discussing the problem of agency capture by well-organized
interest groups).
50 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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8."' Nevertheless, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the new
regulations because the prior Supreme Court approval had rested on
deference to the NLRB's interpretation rather than on the Court's own,
independent interpretation of the NLRA. 2
In Rust v. Sullivan5 3 the so-called "gag rule" case, the Supreme Court
confirmed that deference to agency reinterpretations was appropriate under
Chevron. Rust concerned a Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) 1988 regulation interpreting Title X of the Public Health Service
Act (PHSA).5 4 Section 1008 of the PHSA provided that "[n]one of the
funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning." 5 HHS's 1988 regulation
interpreted this language to preclude Title X recipients from providing
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning. 6 This interpretation contradicted a 1971 HHS regulation that
had held section 1008 to apply only to the provision of abortion services,
not to the dissemination of information about abortion as a method of
family planning. 7 Over strong dissent,58 the Court relied on Chevron and
deferred to the later regulation. After "agree[ing] with every court to have
addressed the issue that the language [of section 1008] is ambiguous, 59
the Court observed that it "ha[d] rejected the argument that an agency's
interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp
break with prior interpretations' of the statute in question., 60 Rather,
because HHS had changed its regiilations based on a "reasoned analysis"
indicating that they were "more in keeping with the original intent of the
statute," the Court felt obliged to defer as long as the regulations
themselves constituted a permissible construction of the statute.6'
51 See id. at 1129-31.
52 See id. at 1130; accord West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaueser, 893 F.2d 1016,
1025-26 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 775 F.2d 366, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to defer to an otherwise reasonable
interpretation that contradicted a prior regulation and stating that "[a]gencies must use their
interpretive discretion with some measure of consistency and reason"). It should be noted, however,
that Clark-Cowlitz was decided shortly after Chevron at a time when Chevron's reach may have been
unclear.
53 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-41 (1994).
55 Id. § 300a-6.
56 The regulation provided that a "title X project may not provide counseling concerning the
use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family
planning." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
57 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor each filed a separate dissent. See id. at 203
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 184.
60 Id. at 186 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 862 (1984)).
61 Id. at 187.
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II. Chevron's Doctrinal Basis and Justification
Commentators have proffered a variety of theoretical justifications of
Chevron, but ultimately these justifications resolve themselves into three
basic positions. Chevron deference is said to rest either on Congress's
delegation to agencies of interpretive power,62 on Congress's delegation to
agencies of legislative power,63 or on courts' independent decision to grant
agencies interpretive power. 64 While the rule of uniform deference to
reasonable agency rules is consistent with the first two of the positions, the
positions themselves rest on questionable grounds. The third position is
sound theoretically, but it does not support the rule of blanket deference to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The third position
also demonstrates why, in terms of the policies underlying judicial review
of administrative rules, Chevron represents a regression from Skidmore.
A. Congressional Delegation to Agencies of Final Interpretive Power
The first, and most popular, interpretation of Chevron conceptualizes
it as establishing a judicial presumption concerning Congress's delegation
of ultimate interpretive power. Under this view, when a statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the question presented, the agency has the last
word on statutory meaning, so long as its interpretation is reasonable. Cass
Sunstein, for example, has stated that, "[i]n Chevron itself, the Court quite
rightly implied that any principle of deference is a product of Congress's
explicit or implicit instructions on that question. The central point is this:
Courts must defer to agency interpretations if and when Congress has told
them to do so. '65 Similarly, Justice Scalia considers Chevron's doctrine of
deference to rest on a presumption of congressional intent to delegate
interpretive authority to agencies in the event of statutory ambiguity or
silence.66 It appears that neither Sunstein nor Scalia finds the notion of
congressional delegation of final interpretive authority troubling, despite
the settled principle, first articulated in Marbury v. Madison, that final
62 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283 (1986).
63 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 5.
64 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 7.
65 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2084.
66 See Scalia, supra note 5, at 516. Others arguing for this interpretation of Chevron include
Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 986, 994-95 (1987) (contending that Chevron establishes a presumption of
a delegation of interpretive power by Congress to administrative agencies and that such delegation
poses no conflict with Marbury v. Madison or the Administrative Procedure Act); and Peter S.
Heinecke, Chevron and the Canon Favoring Indians, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1020-22 (1993)
(arguing that Chevron is best understood as a doctrine of presumptive delegation by Congress of
interpretive power to agencies).
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interpretive authority rests with the courts.67 Rather, both point to the
history of administrative interpretation since the New Deal as clear
evidence of Congress's power to delegate interpretive authority. Congress,
they observe, has often granted statutory authority to promulgate
interpretative rules, and courts have long accorded deference to agencies
acting pursuant to such authority.68
The fact that Chevron creates a presumption that Congress has
delegated interpretive authority to agencies, however, does not support the
proposition that Congress may deprive the courts of such authority.
Moreover, it does not follow as a matter of either logic or policy that
Congress's power to grant agencies authority to interpret statutes
constitutes a withdrawal or limitation of the judiciary's plenary power to
review agency interpretations. 69 Even under a regime of plenary judicial
review of agency rulemaking, parties subject to those rules must come to
court; they must be willing to bring suit in order for a court to exercise that
power. Because of the high cost of bringing suit, many interpretative rules
would remain (and in fact are) final merely because litigants do not wish to
challenge them or lack the necessary resources to do So. 70 Congress,
therefore, would have a reason to grant interpretive authority even if it
believed courts would review all challenged interpretative rules de novo.
More fundamentally, no constitutional doctrine precludes Congress
from according interpretive power to agencies. Marbury states merely that
final authority to interpret the law rests with the judiciary, not that all such
authority is judicial. For this reason, Congress would act rationally in
granting agencies interpretative rulemaking authority even if every
interpretative rule were in fact the subject of a lawsuit, because a statutory
grant of authority to interpret a statute may be viewed by the courts as a
factor in their independent decision whether or not to defer to an agency's
interpretative rule. In practice courts have done this.7' In any event, the
67 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
68 See Scalia, supra note 5, at 514; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2081-82.
69 Cf., e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) (basing deference to
Congress's express grant of interpretive authority on the fact that the agency was instructed to
promulgate its interpretation by legislative rule; regulations are thus "give[n] legislative and hence
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute").
70 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 186 (1983) (observing that fewer
than one percent of Social Security cases eligible for judicial review are in fact subjected to judicial
review).
71 Compare Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d. Cir. 1976) (noting
that little deference should be shown to administrative tribunals lacking interpretative rule- or
policymaking power), with Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989) (noting that deference
should be shown where the agency had specific statutory authority to interpret a statute). See also
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991) (giving
deference to the Secretary but not to OSHRC because only the former has lawmaking authority under
the OHS Act).
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fact of an express or implied congressional grant does not preclude a court
from reviewing an agency's interpretative rule; the grant would simply be
relevant to a court's independent decision to defer or not. Clearly that
deference need not follow from Congress's limitation of the courts. It
would follow instead from Congress's having given the agency the tools to
promulgate rules in a manner that a court believed merited deference.
It is worth noting that this interpretation of Congress's power to
confer interpretative rulemaking authority is consistent with both the
language and the legislative history of the APA. Section 706 of the APA
provides that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions., 72 The 1945
Senate Report confirmed that "interpretative rules . . . are subject to
plenary judicial review . . . ., Justice Scalia characterizes the Senate
Report's assessment as "not categorically true, 74 but it is difficult to see
why. He suggests that Congress did have the power to limit judicial review
by statute, despite § 706. Although he does not state the reason for this
claim, presumably his evidence for it is that courts in fact deferred to
agency interpretations, both before and after passage of the APA.75
According to Scalia, then, a review of the actual circumstances of the
APA's enactment would lead one to read § 706 as granting, in certain
instances, only limited judicial review. One therefore could read § 706 as
an attempt to channel burgeoning administrative control of statutory
interpretation without reversing the established trend of permitting
Congress to take interpretive power from judges and place it in the hands
of bureaucrats.
Scalia's view faces at least two difficulties. As a preliminary matter, it
is hard to see how the APA can be read as countenancing any such
jurisdiction stripping. Section 706, read in conjunction with the Senate
Report, could hardly be clearer on this point.76 Together they state that
Congress may grant interpretative rulemaking authority but that
interpretative rules are subject to plenary judicial review. Further, it is not
even necessary to reconcile § 706 with congressional grants to agencies of
72 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). The fact of an express statutory grant of judicial review should not
be read to support the negative inference that Congress could have withheld judicial review had it
desired. As Sunstein observes, the APA represented a compromise under which Congress
acknowledged the courts' prerogative to interpret the law but retained the power to confer
interpretative rulemaking authority on agencies without judicial acquiescence. See Sunstein, supra note
5, at 2080-81.
73 S. Doc. No. 248, at 18 (1946), quoted in Scalia, supra note 5, at 514.
74 Scalia, supra note 5, at 514.
75 See. e.g., Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 480 (1956) (post-APA deference); NLRB v.
Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (pre-APA deference).
76 Even Sunstein, who supports the delegation of final interpretive authority view,
recognizes that Scalia's treatment "overstates the extent to which deference to administrative
interpretations was contemplated by the APA as evidenced by its text and underlying purposes."
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2081 n.46.
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interpretative rulemaking power. The tension between the APA and such
grants dissolves once one disaggregates Congress's power to grant
interpretative rulemaking authority to agencies from its putative power to
withdraw judicial review. As we have seen, Congress could have ample
reasons to establish interpretative rulemaking authority even if it cannot
make that authority final. Congress envisioned itself as one of at least two
sources of interpretative rulemaking authority given the APA's obvious
intent to permit congressional grants of interpretative rulemaking
authority." Consistent, however, with both the language and legislative
history of the APA, and Marbury's settled principle of the allocation of
judicial power, Congress recognized that its delegation of interpretive
authority cannot supplant the courts' ultimate power to expound the law.
B. Implied Statutory Delegation to Agencies of Quasi-Legislative
Rulemaking Authority
Under a second interpretation of Chevron deference, statutory
ambiguity or silence creates a presumptive delegation of legislative
rulemaking power to interpret the statute to agencies.78 Authority to
promulgate such "interpretive-legislative rules",79 is similar or identical to
the authority Congress can confer by an express delegation of legislative
rulemaking authority. In both instances, agencies promulgate rules that
have "the force of law"80 because the agency acts pursuant to a limited,
congressionally granted power to create law: The agency legislates, and
courts must defer to valid legislative enactments.
The attractiveness of this view derives in large measure from its
apparent consonance with constitutional doctrine and its responsiveness to
the perceived exigencies of the modem administrative state. Unlike the
interpretive-delegation view, the proposition that Congress may delegate
legislative authority to agencies does not offend long-settled separation of
powers principles.8' Further, legislation is not subject to the same
constraints on judicial review as is interpretation. Statutory language,
77 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy," and similar pronouncements from procedural requirements otherwise applicable to
rulemaking).
78 See. e.g., Weaver, supra note 17, at 558 (arguing for deference to agencies'
reinterpretations on the ground that agencies may implement and change policies when changed
circumstances warrant); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 5, at 133-38 (arguing that Chevron establishes
a presumption of congressional delegation to agencies of power to promulgate controlling
interpretative rules so long as agencies justify those rules on policy grounds).
79 1 use the term "interpretive-legislative rule" to designate rules that are promulgated under
an agency's legislative rulemaking authority but that establish an interpretation of statutory language
rather than implement policy.
80 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
81 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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legislative history, and related indicia of statutory meaning all constrain
the interpreter, but legislation has force irrespective of whether it
contradicts a prior rule or view about statutory meaning or intent, so long
as the legislation is otherwise permissible.82 Agencies acting within the
confines of an implied but valid delegation of legislative rulemaking
power are free to change rules as circumstances warrant; they are free from
the constraint of maintaining consistency with prior interpretation.83
Accordingly, like the interpretive-delegation view, the interpretive-
legislative-rule view is consistent with judicial deference to agency
reinterpretations of their governing statutes. Further, it avoids the
interpretive-delegation view's counter-Marbury reading of Chevron as it
does not implicate Congress in any usurpation of judicial power.14 Instead,
statutory gaps and ambiguities are understood as Congress's delegation of
its own core legislative power. Because this power is not confined in its
exercise by prior interpretation, agencies can, within the limits of the
delegation, override existing doctrine by promulgating "new law."
The interpretive-legislative view faces two principal difficulties. First,
it assumes the agency's rule can be classified as "legislative" or
"interpretive" solely by reference to the form of the agency's rulemaking.
The occasion for or nature of the agency's exercise of its rulemaking
authority is not examined when making this determination. In short, it
assumes that because a rule is promulgated according to the APA's notice-
and-comment provisions it qualifies as an exercise of delegated legislative
authority. As the two succeeding sections will demonstrate, resolving a
statutory ambiguity, as contrasted with filling a genuine gap, is not a
legislative or quasi-legislative activity but an interpretive one, irrespective
of the form in which the agency promulgates the rule. In the case of a
formally interpretative rule the second difficulty appears: In that instance,
there are substantial reasons to question the appropriateness of deference
even if the substance of the agency's action is to fill a gap.
I. Statutory Gap Versus Statutory Ambiguity
Although the distinction between gaps and ambiguities has not played
a prominent role in either the courts' application or commentators'
discussion of Chevron, 5 as suggested immediately above, it is of critical
importance for Chevron because it determines the source of agency
authority in rulemaking. Accordingly, in this section I develop a basic
82 See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 21, § 3.5 and cases cited therein.
83 See id.
84 For a view of Chevron as an unconstitutional usurpation of core judicial functions, see
Merrill, supra note 16, at 995-96.
85 See supra Part I.
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analysis of the distinction between gaps and ambiguities. The aim here is
not to develop a comprehensive theory of what constitutes a gap and what
constitutes an ambiguity, but simply to defend the distinction between the
two phenomena at a conceptual level and to outline the fundamental
differences between them.86
In general, gaps involve an absence of statutory language. The
clearest case of a gap arises when Congress expressly creates a gap and
delegates to an agency the power to "fill" it. Provisions of this sort abound
in the Internal Revenue Code, in which Congress frequently establishes a
general statutory framework and leaves to the Treasury Department the
task of filling in specifics. 87 More generally, however, a gap arises any
time there is no law that addresses a question purportedly covered by a
statute. Cass Sunstein describes such a gap as an absence of statutory
language to which an agency or court may refer in order to determine
congressional intent.88 Sunstein cites as an example the term "conspiracies
in restraint of trade" in section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.89 The
language of that act does not supply a ready definition of the term, and,
because the act's very subject matter is restraint of trade, one cannot easily
justify turning to the ordinary meaning of the term, to the extent it may be
discerned, in order to divine its meaning in the act.90
The second, and related, instance of a gap occurs in the rare instance
when a statute contains an undefined technical term. Arguably this was the
case in Chevron, which presented the question of the meaning of
"stationary source," a term not in common parlance or susceptible to
interpretation by recourse to ordinary meaning. As in the case of a
statutory directive to the agency to supply meaning through regulation, the
presence of an undefined technical term in a statute invites regulatory
definition and, at least arguably, redefinition as the circumstances giving
86 For an analysis which aligns with the distiction between gap and ambiguity developed
here, see generally REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 13-33
(1975) (drawing a distinction between ascertainment of statutory meaning through interpretation and
judicial assignment of statutory meaning through creation of law). See also id. at 213-16
(distinguishing various forms of statutory ambiguity from statutory gap).
87 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 446(c)(4) (1994) (granting the Secretary authority to prescribe
regulations defining permissible accounting methods in addition to those set forth in the statute); id. §
475(e) (granting the Secretary authority to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section," relating to the mark-to-market accounting
method); id. § 3402(a)(1) (requiring employers to withhold "in accordance with tables or
computational procedures prescribed by the Secretary").
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv.
405, 421 (1989) ("[T]he problem [in the case of gap-filling] is not that words are susceptible to more
than one construction, but instead that the words necessarily require courts to look to sources outside
of the text.").
89 Id. at 421 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1) (1982 & Supp. V 1997)).
90 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 88, at 422 (noting that the prohibition on "discrimination" in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides little guidance on the meaning of that term in
connection with basic questions about, among other things, discriminatory effect).
Vol. 17:327, 2000
HeinOnline  -- 17 Yale J. on Reg. 344 2000
Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference
rise to regulation change.
By contrast, ambiguity, though routinely grouped with gap by
Chevron commentators, 91 represents a substantially different phenomenon.
Ambiguity does not involve an absence of statutory language so much as
an absence of clear meaning in the statutory language. It is most clearly
present in the case of language that admits of exactly two distinct and
plausible meanings, but it may take other forms, such as multiplicity of
meanings or vagueness of meaning.92 All of these forms have in common
the basic characteristic of a failed aspiration to resolve the "precise
question in issue;" they involve instances in which the language purports
to say something clearly but fails to do so. 93 Examples of ambiguity are
discussed in the next section.
2. Legislative Rulemaking
The assumption that a legislative rule validly promulgated under the
APA's notice and comment provisions represents an instance of agency
legislation underlies the legislative view of Chevron.94 Chevron so
understood stands for the proposition that courts will interpret statutory
silence on the question of delegation, without more, as Congress's implied
delegation of legislative authority to the agency with respect to the point in
question.9 Chevron establishes a canon of statutory "interpretation," not of
the language at issue, but of Congress's intent about how agencies are to
deal with that language and what kind of authority they are to exercise in
91 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 46, at 4 (grouping gap and ambiguity as a gap for purposes
of describing Chevron); Starr, supra note 62, at 294 (describing Chevron deference as applying to
instances in which "a court has determined that Congress had no intent with regard to the question
before it, .. ").
92 See Note, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1732 (1999)
(identifying various kinds of ambiguity, including dual or several meanings, vagueness, and
contestability).
93 In what follows, I assume for purposes of developing the argument that statutory meaning
is primarily a function of the language of the statute itself, and not of legislative history or other
commonly accepted indicia of statutory meaning. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 431 & n.95 (noting
that the issue for courts is what statutes mean, not what legislatures "intend"). The purpose of
employing this "textualist" approach, which has been adopted in this context by other commentators,
see, e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 1729-30 nn.44-45, is simply to keep separate the analytical difference
between "gap" and "ambiguity" from the distinct question of determining what language-statutory or
otherwise-one analyzes with a view to determining the presence of a gap or ambiguity.
94 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 46, at 36 (describing as the "[k]ey [i]nquiry" whether
interpretation in the form provided by an agency is binding); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 244-47 (1992) (treating
the question whether a legislative or interpretative rule was promulgated as dependent on the nature of
agency action and not also on the features of the statute that the rule addresses).
95 "Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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doing so. 96 Chevron says, in effect, that congressional silence or ambiguity
is tantamount to an express congressional delegation of its legislative
97power.
In the pure "gap" case this position is perfectly compatible with the
circumstances of agency rulemaking. The absence of statutory language
and congressional "intent" with respect to the question at issue is at least
consistent with an imputed congressional command to delegate lawmaking
power to an agency. Irrespective of whether policy or existing canons of
statutory interpretation justify this presumption,98 the presumption itself
does not overstep any existing constitutional or statutory constraint. There
are no logical or doctrinal obstacles to the presumption of a congressional
intent to delegate rulemaking authority so long as the agency charged with
administering the statute possesses legislative rulemaking authority. 99
Deference then follows as a matter of course, since a legislative rule that
fills a gap is paradigmatic of legislative rulemaking that has "the force and
effect of law."' 00 Such a rule does not purport to interpret statutory
language but to implement a statute's purpose or purposes in the absence
of statutory language.
The situation is more complex, however, when the agency
promulgates an interpretive-legislative rule. Such a rule does not fill a gap
but instead interprets ambiguous statutory language. Apart from the
reasonableness of inferring from statutory ambiguity a delegation of
authority to promulgate legislative rules is the question of whether such a
delegation, implied or express, is logically consistent with statutory
96 On this point, see id. at 851-53, noting that the issue was whether Congress had an intent
regarding the application of the bubble concept.
97 See Note, supra note 92, at 1731 (observing that ambiguity creates an inference of
delegation to resolve it). The author identifies different types of statutory ambiguity and argues that the
nature of the ambiguity ought to determine the level of judicial deference to the agency's rule. The
author does not address the question whether ambiguity may be reconciled with delegation of
legislative power.
98 For views of the policies that support and oppose Chevron, see, for example, Herz, supra
note 94, at 189-90 (advocating deference limited to agency policy-setting pursuant to a congressional
grant); Scidenfeld, supra note 5, at 125-32 (arguing that a model of political deliberation rather than
interest group accommodation animates the policy of Chevron deference, and therefore that deference
at Chevron's step two should be contingent on evidence of agencies' having engaged in deliberation);
and Weaver, supra note 17, at 554-64 (advocating broad deference on the ground that Chevron
concerns policymaking and implementation and agencies are better suited than courts to these tasks).
99 Indeed, the presumption rests on just the sort of factors courts traditionally use to
ascertain congressional "intent" in the face of statutory silence. These factors include both inferences
about Congress's actual or hypothetical intent to delegate and policy arguments as to which body-the
agency or a court-is better suited to decide policy questions. See, e.g., Pauley v. Beth Energy Mines,
501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (holding that a delegation of policymaking authority, either expressly or
through an "introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory structure," limits judicial review);
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (stating that a precondition to deference is
congressional delegation of administrative authority). P. Monaghan articulated this view prior to
Chevron in Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 31 (1983).
100 Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,425 n.9 (1977).
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ambiguity. In fact it is not. Although a delegation of genuine legislative
power is not intrinsically suspect, Congress ought not be understood to
grant that power as a way of resolving statutory ambiguity. For, as distinct
from the case of a true gap, in the case of an ambiguity the statute does
reflect an intent to settle the point at issue--even if the statute may fail to
actually settle it.'01 The manifestation of that intent is inconsistent with the
existence of an intent to grant to another body a mandate to implement
policy through rules that may change as circumstances warrant. The
problem, then, is not simply that statutory silence about delegation is less
likely to support the inference of legislative rulemaking power, but that a
statute's failed attempt to set policy is not consistent with a delegation of
policy-implementing power. An infelicitous effort to set forth a rule is
nevertheless an effort to set forth a rule.
Section 318 of the Internal Revenue Code, °2 which contains rules for
the attribution of ownership of stock for certain federal income tax
purposes, provides an illustration of the point. Subparagraph (a)(2)(B) of
that section sets forth two rules for the attribution of stock from trusts. The
first rule provides, subject to certain exceptions, that stock owned by or for
a trust is considered as owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to their
actuarial interest in the trust.'0 3 The second rule provides, also subject to
certain exceptions, that in the case of stock owned by a grantor trust, all
stock owned by the trust shall be considered as owned by the grantor of the
trust.' 4 A grantor trust is defined, in general, as any trust that is revocable
by the grantor.'0 5 The ambiguity arises from the fact that the statute does
not specify the relationship between the two provisions of § 318(a)(2)(B).
As a result, it is unclear whether grantor trusts are subject to both
attribution rules or just to the second. Read literally, it would appear that
both rules apply, because the statute purports to list rules of general
application and there is no specific exclusion of grantor trusts from the
first rule. Policy considerations, however, suggest that only the second rule
should apply to grantor trusts. In general, the purpose of the attribution
rules is to treat individuals or entities that have beneficial ownership or
control of stock as owners of the stock for certain federal income tax
purposes. 0 6 Where a grantor retains the power to revoke, the benefits of
101 In many instances, of course, infelicitous statutory language simply reflects Congress's
desire that another body settle the issue. This fact in no way alters the fact that Congress has chosen to
dodge the issue by giving interpretive authority to another body.
102 26 U.S.C. § 318 (1994).
103 See id. § 318(a)(2)(B)(i).
104 See id. § 318(a)(2)(B)(ii).
105 See id. § 676(a).
106 See, e.g., id. § 302(c)(1) (providing that, in general, the attribution rules of 26 U.S.C. §
318(a) shall apply for purposes of determining whether stock redemptions qualify for sale or exchange
treatment or for dividend treatment); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Attribution Rules, 554 TAX
MGMT. PORTFOLIO, A-I (1996) (stating that the attribution rules "operate to prevent taxpayers from
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stock ownership that the trust's beneficiaries enjoy would appear to flow
more from the grantor than from the trust itself.
There can be little doubt that either interpretation is plausible. That is,
the Treasury Department could issue a valid regulation that subjected
grantor trusts to both of the attribution rules, or just to the second. Of
significance for present purposes, however, is what effect any such rule
would have on a future rule that Treasury might issue in the absence of an
intervening change in the statute. In particular, it is far from clear that a
subsequent, contrary regulation ought to merit the same kind of deference
that the Supreme Court accorded the EPA's second interpretation of
"stationary source" in Chevron. Unlike the provision at issue there, §
318(a)(2)(B) does not contain undefined technical terms; rather, the statute
clearly purports to set forth a comprehensive set of rules regarding
attribution, but it fails because it does not specify the relationship between
clauses (i) and (ii). The statute's evident aspiration to comprehensiveness
implies that Treasury's preliminary decision about that relationship, in the
form of a validly promulgated regulation, would not be a decision pursuant
to an implied congressional mandate to implement policy but rather an
interpretive decision about what Congress intended but did not say, or
about what Congress would have said had it addressed the precise point in
issue.' °7 Having settled on that interpretation, there would be no basis to
reverse it on the ground that, for example, circumstances changed while
the statute itself remained unchanged.
A contrast of § 318 as written with a hypothetical § 318 that
contained a gap on the same issue illustrates the very different nature of
the rulemaking activity in the gap case. If, for instance, § 318(a)(2)
contained no rules whatsoever about trust attribution but was still titled
"Attribution from partnership, estates, trusts, and corporations.-", a
permissible construction of the statute (though perhaps not the best one)
would be that Congress had intended to delegate to Treasury the power to
set policy by creating rules for trusts. In that event, Treasury would be
authorized not only to set such rules, but also to change them in light of
changing circumstances, in both instances under an implied delegation of
genuine legislative authority.
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute108  provides a second
illustration of how the delegation question differs in the ambiguity and gap
artificially splitting their share ownership so as to avoid the bright lines set in the [Internal Revenue]
Code, while maintaining de facto control by virtue of the special relationship between the persons who
own the shares").
107 The fact that Treasury's first rule might be based, in whole or part, on policy
considerations does not change the analysis. The relevance of policy to determining statutory meaning
does not equate to or imply a power to alter statutory meaning through administrative rule, even if the
alteration is based on consistent policy considerations.
108 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
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cases. In Young, the issue was the Department of Health and Human
Services' (HHS) interpretation of its statutory mandate to issue regulations
governing poisonous substances in food. The statute provided in part that
the secretary "shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity of
[poisonous substances] to such extent as he finds necessary for the
protection of public health."'0 9 The question for the Supreme Court
concerned the proper interpretation of the phrase "to such extent as he
finds necessary." HHS had promulgated a legislative rule that interpreted
this language as giving the secretary discretion to issue regulations. The
D.C. Circuit disagreed, ruling that the phrase "to such extent" qualified
only "limiting the quantity" and therefore that the secretary did not have
discretion to refrain from issuing rules; he had discretion merely to limit
the regulation of the various substances that fell under the rules."0 The
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the HHS rule. The Court noted that
although Congress might have attempted to address the precise question at
issue, it had failed to do so. The Court accordingly found itself governed
by Chevron's step two and determined that HHS's rule was a permissible
construction of the statute."'
Again, it is instructive to compare Young as it was actually decided
with a hypothetical Young involving gap-filling. Let us suppose that the
statute in Young had simply said, "the secretary shall promulgate
regulations governing the quantity of poisonous substances in food," but
that the remaining facts of Young were unchanged. In that case, the statute
would not have beem ambiguous with respect to the extent of the
secretary's duty to promulgate regulations; it instead would have contained
a gap with respect to the scope of that duty. It seems clear that faced with
such a gap, the Supreme Court would have deferred to HHS's rule, just as
it did in the actual case, but that the rationale for deference would have
been different in the hypothetical case. In deferring in the case where the
statute was silent, a court could reasonably determine that silence
supported a presumption that Congress wanted the secretary to give effect
to statutory purposes by creating law. That presumption would have been
reasonable given Congress's manifest desire to have the agency fill gaps
and given that the language of the statute could not be interpreted as
attempting to speak to the issue in question. 12 In effect, statutory silence
109 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994).
110 See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354, 357-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
111 See Young, 476 U.S. at 980. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, objected that the Court
was "merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference." Id. at 988 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
112 This hypothetical case thus would have provided an occasion for deference similar to that
in Chevron itself. The Chevron Court expressly found that Congress had not spoken to the question of
the proper definition of "stationary source." On the basis of that finding, it was reasonable for the
Court to hold that Congress had granted the EPA authority to legislate the definition, since it was at
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would have made plausible" l3 the presumption that, had Congress been
aware of the gap, Congress would have expressly granted the agency
authority to issue regulations to "fill" it. Accordingly, a subsequent
reversal of position by HHS under the hypothetical statute, in the form of a
rule directing the secretary to regulate the quantity of poisonous substances
in all foods, would be valid as a permitted exercise of delegated legislative
authority.
By contrast, in the actual scenario of Young the Court gave effect to
the secretary's interpretation of what the statute tried to say or said poorly.
That administrative interpretation and not legislation was at issue is
reflected in the fact that the statutory language reasonably could be viewed
only as saying either what the D.C. Circuit ruled it said, or what HHS
stated in its rule. The Court recognized as much by conceding that the
language attempted, however infelicitously, to address the precise question
at issue.1 14 In effect the Court held that, between HHS and the courts, HIHS
was better equipped to clarify the statute's imprecise language; the Court
did not find, nor would it have been reasonable to find, that the language
did not attempt to limit the secretary in one way or the other. The statute
did not have a gap. It therefore would not be reasonable to interpret the
ambiguity as delegating power to the agency to legislate a rule rather than
merely to interpret the statute. It will not do to treat the statute as
simultaneously purporting to reach an issue and not purporting to do so. If
the Court legitimately could defer to HHS's actual rule, it could not do so
on the ground that Congress had delegated final authority to set policy toHHS.IIl r
The preceding analysis demonstrates that courts face fundamentally
different issues depending on whether a statute is ambiguous or silent. If it
is silent, Chevron may be read to hold that the agency has legislative
rulemaking power to fill the gap. Such a power would enable the agency
both to promulgate an initial rule and later to "reinterpret" the statute in a
least plausible to think Congress had not understood the statute to define the term. Moreover, befitting
its review of an exercise of delegated policy-setting power, the Court was properly unimpressed with
the objection to deference based on the EPA's reversal of its prior rules. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984). In the context of law making, a
"flexible rather than rigid definition of the term 'source"' was appropriate. Id. at 856.
113 For present purposes, it is not important whether the presumption is the best one, or even
reasonable; the argument here concerns merely the logical coherence of the rule that ambiguity
supports a presumption of delegated power to ,implement policy rather than merely to interpret the
statute. Objections to Chevron deference on policy grounds are taken up in Part Ill.
114 See Young, 476 U.S. at 980. Similarly, the Court could not reasonably have suggested
that the phrase "limited to" was a technical term.
115 The distinction developed here between gap and ambiguity bears some similarity to that
between vagueness and ambiguity suggested by Professors Eskridge and Frickey. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 839 (1988) ("Ambiguity creates an 'either/or' situation, while vagueness
creates a variety of possible meanings.").
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contrary fashion if the agency deemed such a change necessary to give
effect to the policies underlying the statute. In this case, the only question
for the court is whether the agency has acted in a manner consistent with
the terms of its delegation. Consistency turns on the rule's consonance not
with statutory language, of which there is none, but with statutory policy.
Statutory ambiguity, by contrast, cannot support a presumption of
delegated policymaking authority, because the statute addresses the
question raised, even though it does not in fact answer it. Because the
statute purports to answer the question, it cannot simultaneously be read to
support a grant to the agency of power not merely to clarify the statute but
further to use the ambiguity as an occasion to implement policy through
legislation. Ambiguity, in other words, presents an issue of interpretive,
not legislative, power, and its presence supports at most a presumption that
Congress wanted another body to resolve the ambiguity. 1
6
The proposition that Congress may not require judicial deference to
legislative rules that resolve statutory ambiguity is likely to meet
opposition on at least two grounds. First, while the view that Chevron
deference ought to apply only to statutory silence but not to ambiguity is
not new,' 7 a troubling notion is that what precludes deference to
ambiguity is Congress's impotence to require it. It is by now axiomatic
that legislative rules promulgated pursuant to an express statutory grant of
rulemaking power carry the force of law." 8 Such rules receive judicial
deference irrespective of their purport, so long as they remain within the
confines of the delegation. In other words, courts do not distinguish
between legislative rules that legislate and those that interpret. Most
commentators who are critical of Chevron's rule of deference accordingly
operate within the established framework of deference to legislative
rulemaking. They do not object to express congressional grants of
authority to agencies to treat ambiguity as a license to legislate, but only to
116 One might object that Chevron itself couched the agency's rulemaking activity as a
policy decision, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66, and therefore that the very rationale of Chevron is to
enable informed policy-based decision-making in place of the often uninformed judicial resolution of
interpretive issues that had formerly taken place. This objection confuses the relevance of statutory
policy to determining statutory meaning with a putative agency power to establish and to change rules
as policy dictates. Agencies and courts alike often advert to policy in order to decide upon statutory
meaning, but the propriety of doing so is not equivalent to a license to legislate in order to give effect
to statutory purposes.
117 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 94, at 207 (arguing that ambiguity arising only from
Congress's "intent to express nothing" merits deference under Chevron); Sunstein, supra note 5, at
2090 ("[Almbiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power, and it would be a major error
to treat all ambiguities as delegations."); cf. Farina, supra note 5, at 468-76, (arguing against Chevron
deference both where Congress has left a gap in a statute and where a statute is ambiguous).
118 See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977); accord United States v. Morton, 467
U.S. 822, 834 (1984); see also I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 21, § 6.3 (arguing that the primary
distinction between "substantive" rules meriting judicial deference and interpretive rules subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny is the procedure under which substantive, but not interpretive, rules are
promulgated).
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the presumption that ambiguity represents an implied delegation of that
authority." 9
Similarly, it is in relation to express versus implied delegation that
defenders of Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutory
ambiguity typically make their case. Professor Herz claims, for example,
that a "greater includes the lesser" argument applies to interpretive-
legislative rules. 120 He reasons that "[i]f Congress can hand over legislative
authority, it surely can make an initial attempt at legislation and then
assign an agency the task of figuring out what it did, subject to judicial
review to ensure that the agency's conclusion is 'permissible."",t2' In short,
whenever Congress creates an ambiguity subject to deference under
Chevron, Congress also could have created a gap and left to the agency the
task of filling it. Since, therefore, the gap case subsumes the case of
statutory ambiguity, deference appears to follow as a matter of course for
both cases. Viewed in this light, the distinction between gap and ambiguity
verges on the meaningless, and an insistence on different treatment of the
two cases appears merely pedantic.
The surface plausibility of Herz's position should not, however, blind
one to its failure to take account of the specific difference between a
statutory gap and an ambiguity. In the first place, we should recall that
Congress has not, in fact, exercised its "greater" power in the case of
statutory ambiguity. It has not left a gap in the statute or, much less,
expressly delegated rulemaking authority on the issue in question. If the
fact that Congress could have done either of these is supposed to permit
courts to act as though it had, then the argument proves too much.
Congress typically does not act at the limit of its powers, and courts
ordinarily will not presume an implied exercise of congressional power to
the maximum extent constitutionally permitted from statutory silence with
regard to the reach of a congressional enactment.121
More significantly, this argument erroneously assumes that the
difference between resolving statutory ambiguity and filling a statutory
gap is purely quantitative. That is, it assumes that an agency's interpretive-
legislative rule that resolves ambiguous statutory language does not
perform a different kind of role from the legislative rule that fills a
statutory gap; it is merely "lesser." But, as we have seen, the two activities
119 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 94, at 192; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2085-86. Of course, in
many cases, the failure to make this distinction makes little practical difference because an
independent judicial basis for deference exists. Where, however, agency reinterpretation is at issue,
that independent basis may not exist. See supra Part IC:
120 See Herz, supra note 94, at 202.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding that "unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance").
352
Vol. 17:327, 2000
HeinOnline  -- 17 Yale J. on Reg. 352 2000
Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference
differ because of the specific difference in the statutory deficiencies they
remedy. The existence of a gap may support an inference of agency power
to fill it and to change the way in which it is filled as circumstances dictate
if necessary to fulfill the statutory purpose or purposes. Ambiguity, by
contrast, implies a consideration of the very issue that has not been
resolved. Such consideration is not consistent with a decision to allow
another body to implement statutory purposes through its own legislative
activity."'
A second ground of opposition to the view developed here is a
practical one. The preceding argument concluded that a blanket rule of
judicial deference to reasonable interpretive-legislative rules cannot rest on
an implied legislative delegation because such rules are the product of
interpretive, not legislative, activity, and Congress lacks the power to
require judicial deference to agencies' interpretations. The argument was
not a critique of the view that agencies should be understood to have
exercised their legislative rulemaking power where Congress has not
expressly provided for such exercise. 124 It thus might appear that courts
have no business deferring to the innumerable "interpretations" that
agencies routinely generate in the form of legislative rules. One might
argue that if a reading of Chevron that is consistent with Marbury demands
this much, then perhaps it is time to jettison Marbury rather than Chevron
and its progeny. Given the necessity of agency interpretation and the
difficulty of competent de novo judicial resolution of the countless issues
agencies resolve through this kind of interpretive "legislation," an
insistence on adhering to Marbury's perceived requirement of final
judicial resolution seems perverse. It ignores the exigencies of the modem
administrative state and insists instead on a form of adjudication suited
only to the outdated model of the passive, non-administrative state.
This argument from administrative exigency fails to recognize that
the denial of Congress's power to require deference does not imply the
absence of courts' power to employ it-an observation that appears to
have escaped a number of commentators. 125 Congress is not the only
possible source of a deference requirement, and Marbury, as a separation
of powers case, says nothing about the limits courts may place upon
themselves when they engage in statutory interpretation. As argued below
in Part II.B.3, courts do retain the power to defer to agencies' interpretive-
123 See. e.g., Note, supra note 92, at 1736 (arguing that ambiguities of an either/or nature, as
contrasted with those that admit of gradations, ordinarily do not support an inference of delegation).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) (granting regulations
"legislative and hence controlling weight" on the ground that "Congress explicitly delegated authority
to construe the statute by regulation").
125 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 5, at 464 (characterizing the "power-shifting" of Chevron as
a choice between deference to the agency and de novo review); Weaver, supra note 17, at 558-60
(framing the Chevron debate as a choice between deference to the agency and de novo judicial review).
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legislative rules, and there is no reason why Chevron cannot be read as
commanding this kind of deference.
3. Interpretative Rulemaking
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether
interpretative rules merit Chevron deference, though it has suggested they
do not.'26 Lower federal courts are divided on the subject. 27 In any event,
the case for deference to interpretative rules is clearly more tenuous than it
is for legislative rules, which are promulgated with greater procedural
safeguards and are more likely to reflect the agency's informed and
considered judgment. 28 For this reason, if Congress lacks the power to
require judicial deference to an agency's legislative (in form) clarification
of an ambiguous statute, it would seem clear that Congress may not
require deference to an interpretative rule performing the same role.
Interpretative rules, which are not promulgated under the APA's notice
and comment procedure, do not have the force and effect of law.' 29 In
addition, wholly apart from the procedural failure to comply with the
APA's notice and comment provisions, interpretative rules merit less
deference simply because they tend to be the product of a less formal, less
rigorous process.
The situation is different in the case of interpretative rules that fill
statutory gaps. As argued above, a statutory gap is the one case in which
we may assume Congress to have delegated genuine legislative power to
an agency charged with administering the statute. But that argument
presupposed that the agency had been the beneficiary of a grant of
legislative rulemaking power, even if implied and general rather than
126 In Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,157 (1991),
the Court stated that interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines are entitled to "some deference" but
not "to the same deference" that legislative rules receive. In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991), the Court cited Skidmore and not Chevron in refusing to defer to an EEOC interpretative
rule. Justice Scalia disagreed with this approach, arguing for deference under Chevron but concurring
in the judgment because he found the interpretation unreasonable. See id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). The Court has never expressly stated that Chevron is
inapplicable to interpretative rules.
127 Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1327 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)
(deferring to the agency's interpretative rule), and General Motors v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561,
1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same), with Capitano v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 732 F.2d 1066,
1076 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to defer under Chevron because the regulation was not legislative).
128 Legislative rules may be promulgated only following either notice and comment or trial-
type hearings on the record. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (notice and comment rulemaking); id § 556
(trial-type hearing on the record).
129 See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983) (noting the significance of the procedural characteristics of rulemaking in the
determination whether to defer to the agency's interpretative rule); see generally Kevin W. Saunders,
Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposalfor Public Participation, 1986
DUKE L.J. 346 (discussing the differences between legislative and interpretative rules).
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express and focused, and it assumed that the agency had filled the gap by
legislative rule. Agency action by interpretative rule raises different
barriers to a presumption of a congressionally imposed requirement of
judicial deference. In the first place, one must be able to justify the
presumption of congressional intent to give legislative effect to a rule that
does not comply with legally mandated legislative rulemaking procedures.
Secondly, and more significantly, it must be possible to show that
Congress may require the courts to treat an agency's procedurally
interpretative rule as though it were legislative.
With respect to congressional intent, the presumption of a grant of the
power to make new law through interpretative rulemaking is questionable.
As an initial matter, the presumption seems counterintuitive as a canon of
statutory construction. As even Chevron's proponents recognize,
30
Chevron's step two typically is reached because the reviewing court has
determined that Congress failed to consider the question at issue. In the
event of such a failure, Chevron prevents Congress, in the absence of an
express retention of legislative power, from controlling an agency's
exercise of that same power by legislative rule. Chevron thus sets up the
counterintuitive presumption that Congress's failure to foresee an issue
represents a decision to delegate the maximum authority possible to
resolve it. But where Congress has failed to foresee an issue, one would
expect Congress to cede less power to address it, especially where
legislative rulemaking authority is absent. That is, one would expect
Congress to have ceded, at most, interpretive power to construe the statute,
rather than legislative power to supplement or change it.'3 ' This more
limited grant of authority would permit agency resolution of the issue
without placing Congress in the awkward position of having constantly to
safeguard its plenary legislative power against agency usurpation. It also
would leave intact the presumption that Congress exercises federal
legislative authority absent strong indications of an intent to delegate that
authority to another body. Finally, it is consonant with the established
reading of the non-delegation doctrine, according to which agency exercise
of legislative power requires a clear and circumscribed delegation of the
power from Congress.
32
It is true that in those instances in which statutory ambiguity or
silence is intentional, the assumption of an intent to delegate the decision
130 See Scalia, supra note 5, at 516.
131 See Herz, supra note 94, at 195 (observing that "Congress should prefer relatively
stringent judicial review of agency interpretations" because of its interest in withholding power from
the executive branch).
132 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541.-F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (observing that courts' willingness to uphold
congressional delegation is predicated on plenary judicial review of agency rules promulgated pursuant
to an intelligible principle of delegation).
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to resolve the question arguably makes sense. When Congress is unable to
reach agreement on an issue, or chooses to dodge it, its members
presumably recognize that resolution will have to be forthcoming from
some body. 33 But that recognition does not support an inference of
delegated legislative, as opposed to interpretative, rulemaking authority.
The requirement for a decision does not entail that the decision be
legislative: A decision will be reached irrespective of the nature of the
power exercised to reach it.134 More importantly, even if Chevron
ambiguity or silence did support such a presumption, without more, that
presumption would conflict with relevant provisions of the APA. Section
553 of the APA provides for notice and comment proceedings in the case
of formal legislative rulemaking. It further directs agencies to provide the
formal trial-type proceedings of § 556 where the governing statute requires
a decision "on the record after opportunity for agency hearing.' 35
Disregarding the policy reasons that support notice and comment or trial-
type formal hearings as prerequisites to legislative rulemaking, 36 it
remains difficult simply as a matter of statutory interpretation to see how
step-two ambiguity or silence in an agency's governing statute negates
these provisions of the APA. This difficulty is compounded by the long-
settled rule that the APA is a default statute applicable where the
governing statute does not expressly override it.' 37
Finally, constitutional due process or its legislative analog might
preclude the exercise of interpretative rulemaking power that had the effect
of legislative rulemaking where agencies acted without any input from
potentially affected parties and the rulemaking process was entirely closed
off from public scrutiny. While the Supreme Court has been disinclined to
hold rulemaking to due process standards,'38 the Court has never squarely
addressed a constitutional challenge to a de facto legislative rule that
afforded parties vastly diminished access to the agency's decision-making
procedures. 39 Instead, the Court typically has addressed the narrower issue
of a right to participation in rulemaking. 140 This issue is the hallmark of
133 See Note, supra note 92, at 1723 n.2.
134 See Herz, supra note 94, at 195-96.
135 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (d) (1994).
136 See discussion infra Part Ill.
137 A court will hold an agency to the APA's legislative rulemaking requirements once the
court has determined that the agency has promulgated what is in effect a legislative rule-one that
intends to create new law, rights or duties. See General Motors v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
138 No due process tight to a hearing exists for parties affected by legislative rules. See Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
139 The absence of a constitutional challenge on this point doubtless is due in large measure
to the fact that parties typically raise procedural challenges to legislative rulemaking under the APA's
provisions governing agency lawmaking. These provisions have been held to satisfy constitutional due
process requirements. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
140 See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984)
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due process in administrative adjudication, but it is not the only
constitutional question relevant to agency legislation. In particular, it is not
clear whether constitutional protections would require greater openness in
legislative rulemaking than is often present when agencies promulgate
interpretative rules. After all, Congress may not pass legislation by secret
ballot, nor may it conduct legislative business behind closed doors. If
Congress is limited in this respect, it is unclear why an agency exercising
congressionally delegated power would not be as well. 41
Consistent with this analysis, the Supreme Court has suggested that
concerns of fundamental fairness could, in the extreme case, place limits
on agencies' legislative rulemaking even when the requirements of the
APA did not apply.142 Rules evaluated under Chevron step two could pose
such an extreme case, since agencies often are free to, and often do,
promulgate interpretative rules or guidelines without any warning to or
input from outside parties. 143
C. Chevron as a Doctrine of Independent Judicial Deference to Agencies
A third position understands Chevron deference as, in part, a
prudential doctrine that the courts have elected to apply independent of
congressional or statutory mandates.' 44 On this view, except in the case of
a legislative rule that fills a statutory gap, Chevron represents an
independent decision by the courts to permit agencies to exercise final
interpretive authority. Often the power to exercise interpretive authority
(denying a due process right to a hearing on a legislative rule on the ground that affording such rights
to all affected by legislative rules would be impractical).
141 This argument may be viewed as the converse of the argument sometimes used to deny a
due process right to a hearing when agencies promulgate legislative rules. The argument reasons from
the absence of right to a congressional hearing to the absence of a right to appear before an agency that
is engaged in rulemaking. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 21, § 9.2 (outlining objections to due
process arguments to hearing rights in non-individualized contexts). But the same reasoning would
appear to hold that limitations on congressional secrecy and the requirement of congressional
accountability extend to administrative rulemaking proceedings also.
For objections to granting interpretative rules legislative effect, see Herz, supra note 94, at 210-
II (discussing rationales supporting reduced deference).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 243 (1979) (holding that
the ICC's procedures in the rulemaking context are not covered by the APA because they offered
potentially affected parties ample access to the rulemaking process); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524
(recognizing the possibility of "extremely rare" circumstances in which agency procedures under the
governing statute might afford insufficient process to parties potentially affected by legislative
rulemaking).
143 For example, agencies often provide only general guidelines, or they set policy merely by
stating that certain standards or rules shall govern. See, e.g., Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818
F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FDA's "action letters" were not binding rules because they
were not formally promulgated); see generally Internal Revenue Bulletin 1998-1 (stating that Intemal
Revenue Service (IRS) revenue rulings and revenue procedures represent the IRS's interpretation of
the tax law).
144 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 7, at 1289-94 (arguing that Chevron deference is an
instance of the judiciary's self-imposed limitation on its own jurisdiction).
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also has been the subject of an express grant by Congress.
To a certain extent, the contours of the independent judicial deference
position have been stated in the two preceding sections. As we have seen,
reading Chevron as an implied grant by Congress to agencies of the power
to interpret statutes, even if by formally legislative rule, poses no
constitutional or statutory problems as long as that grant is not construed
as either exclusive or final. Nor does the APA establish any procedural
hurdles analogous to those an administrative rule must clear in order to
count as a valid exercise of interpretative rulemaking authority. Congress
may grant the authority to interpret statutes and leave the determination of
the best procedure for promulgating interpretative rules to individual
agencies. 1
45
Indeed, the doctrinal questions relevant to judicial deference center
not on its constitutionality, but on the specific nature and jurisdictional
sweep of the deference. There are two reasons for this narrower focus.
First, the tradition of judicial deference to agencies has become well
entrenched in the last forty years. Agencies now enjoy judicial deference
as a matter of course, and it is inconceivable that courts could abandon
deference without wreaking havoc on their own dockets particularly and
on administration generally. 46 More importantly, it is clear that federal
courts have a general prudential power to decline to adjudicate cases they
are statutorily or constitutionally empowered to hear. For example, federal
courts may determine that an otherwise adjudicable case presents a
political question147 that is best left to resolution by the other branches of
the federal government. Or, under any of several abstention doctrines,
federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction in favor of
resolution in a state tribunal. 48
In administrative law, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction presents the
closest parallel to independent judicial deference to agency rulemaking.
Primary jurisdiction permits federal courts to grant administrative agencies
original jurisdiction to adjudicate claims within their distinctive
competence or where a need for national uniformity is present. 149 This
grant of adjudicative power is a kind of referral. Courts then may review
145 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994).
146 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2079-82.
147 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), contains a "definitive," though probably not
exhaustive, statement of the circumstances in which a case presents a nonjusticiable political question.
148 For example, the doctrine of Pullman abstention permits federal courts to decline to
adjudicate cases raising a constitutional question if the case also presents a question of state law
adjudicable in state court and adjudication of the state law question will resolve the controversy. See
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
149 See, e.g., United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (discussing issues
beyond the conventional competence of judges); Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907) (requiring uniformity in federal programs).
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agency decisions on appeal, 5 ' though typically that review is
deferential.' Unlike statutory jurisdiction, primary jurisdiction "is a
doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in court that
contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative
agency."' 52  For this reason, primary jurisdiction "involves a more
pragmatic evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the
agency to resolve an issue in the first instance.""'
The principal difference between primary jurisdiction and Chevron
deference consists in the formal roles the agency and the court play in the
two instances. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction the agency
reaches a quasi-judicial decision, and the court typically functions as a
court of appeal, though its review may be de novo. It reviews a prior
adjudication that itself has the salient features of a trial. By contrast, courts
deferring to agency rules do not function as reviewing bodies, but as
tribunals of original jurisdiction. Although the agency rule in most
instances predates the court's adjudication, the court is the first forum to
address and resolve the concrete controversy that has arisen between the
parties. Accordingly, the questions raised by the independent judicial
deference view center on the nature of the power courts and agencies
exercise under Chevron. Although such values as agency expertise and
national uniformity may animate both primary jurisdiction and Chevron, it
appears that agencies play an ancillary role when courts defer to agency
rules rather than to agency adjudication.' 5 4
As I have suggested above, to argue that Chevron deference to
reasonable agency interpretations is a prudential doctrine does not settle all
questions concerning the legitimate scope of that deference. Different
doctrinal results follow depending upon its basis. For instance, one might
understand Chevron as representing a kind of justiciability doctrine akin to
the political question doctrine.'" So read, Chevron effectively stands for
150 See Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (reversing the rate
scheme earlier held to fall under the FMB's primary jurisdiction).
151 See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 21, § 14.1; see also American Auto. Mfrs.' Ass'n v.
Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 163 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 1998) (invoking primary jurisdiction to
defer to the EPA's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
152 Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993); see also American Auto. Mfrs. 'Ass'n, 163
F.3d at 81 ("When the matter at issue is primarily one of statutory interpretation, referral of that matter
to the agency with primary jurisdiction may also be generally advisable in precisely those
circumstances in which a court would defer to the agency's interpretation pursuant to Chevron ... .
153 2 DAVIs& PIERCE, supra note 21, § 14.1.
154 For an instance of the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the context of
Chevron deference, see New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157 (1st
Cir. 1989), in which the court invoked primary jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
and then deferred to DOT's rule on Chevron grounds. Chevron was directly implicated because the
adjudicative fact resolved by DOT related exclusively to "legal conclusions" reached by the Secretary
of the DOT. See id. at 167-68.
155 Callahan aptly describes justiciability as "look[ing] to the appropriateness of providing a
judicial response to a given problem." Callahan, supra note 7, at 1290.
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the proposition that reasonable agency rules present nonjusticiable
questions--questions the courts are constitutionally and statutorily
empowered to reach but that are inappropriate for judicial resolution.5 6
Or, Chevron might be "understood as having established what is
essentially a rule of abstention in favor of another governmental
decisionmaker."' 57 On this abstention view, Chevron deference would rest
on the idea that judicial resolution of statutory ambiguity or silence
represents an invasion into agency decision-making processes that deserve
to remain sacrosanct. In either case, Chevron deference would amount to a
judicial refusal, on prudential grounds of comity, expertise, or political
expedience to decide a case falling under the court's jurisdiction.
The greatest difficulty facing the justiciability analysis is its
incompatibility with courts' actual conduct in cases of Chevron deference.
Justiciability questions typically concern the propriety of federal judicial
decision, not the grounds for decision. In this respect, justiciability is a
doctrine of federal court jurisdiction rather than of source of law.'58 By
contrast, courts exercising Chevron deference actually decide the cases
before them.'59 Bringing Chevron within the ambit of justiciability
doctrines thus would require a reading of that doctrine that is
fundamentally at odds with its purpose of controlling federal court
jurisdiction.
In fact, the judicial expertise model furnishes a much more apposite
description of most instances of Chevron deference to agencies'
interpretations. In particular, this model accurately describes Chevron
deference except where courts defer to agencies' legislative rules that fill
statutory gaps. It also supplies a theoretical foundation for Chevron
deference for all cases that does not offend established constitutional
doctrine. At bottom, the judicial expertise view rests on the principle that
156 In particular, Chevron might appear to qualify as an instance of Baker v. Carr's second
kind of political question, presenting "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards."
Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
157 Callahan, supra note 7, at 1289.
158 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-69 (2d ed. 1988).
Tribe characterizes justiciability rules as a "self-regarding" jurisdictional doctrine created by the
federal courts. See id.
159 Indeed, courts do not merely leave Chevron deference cases to agency resolution; they
adopt as their own the views that agencies provide in their rules. There is no other way to explain the
binding character of prior adjudication on future litigants where the court earlier deferred to an
agency's interpretative rule. In such a case, future litigants may not appeal to the absence of judicial
precedent on the point in question should they wish to contest the rule before a reviewing court.
Rather, the earlier case binds them no differently than if the court had reached a decision de novo in
the first adjudication. Indeed, even the agency will be bound where its interpretative rule has been the
subject of Chevron deference and the agency has not in the interim supplanted the old rule with a new
one. If Chevron deference consisted in substituting agency rulemaking for court adjudication, this
result would not follow. In particular, agencies would be able to abandon the agency rule earlier
accepted by a court on the ground that the court had not "reached" the question and so had not decided
it.
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in most instances a court's deference is purely substantive and has nothing
to do with a judgment about who has the authority to decide. The court
might accept the agency's interpretation, but in doing so the court simply
elects to adopt the agency's judgment as its own; it does not give the
agency authority to render the judgment. In this respect, deference is akin
to a court's independent reliance on an expert called at trial, and the
Supreme Court's admonition to defer is essentially a rule about whose
expertise the court must rely on where a statute is ambiguous or the agency
has not promulgated a legislative rule. But under Chevron, just as in the
case of a court's reliance on a court-appointed expert, the fact of judicial
deference in no way deprives the court's decision of its full judicial
import. 160 The court makes a decision about who has more expertise, not
about who has statutory or constitutional authority to decide.
The most important consequence of the judicial deference view is that
deference to agency interpretations must be consistent with the exercise of
judicial power. If the practice of deference does not diminish the judicial
exercise of power, then courts remain no less circumscribed when
deferring than when fashioning a rule de novo. The contrary view would
have to explain how a court's mere "consultation" with an agency in aid of
judicial power would permit an expansion or transformation of that power.
This feature of specifically judicial -deference again would serve to
distinguish a case like Young from Chevron. Despite the functional
similarity of the agency rules in the two settings, the Court's deference in
Chevron rested on Congress's valid delegation of legislative rulemaking
authority; in contrast, according to the reading of Young developed in this
Article, there the FDA merely promulgated an interpretation. Accordingly,
although a redefinition by the EPA of the technical term "stationary
source" should merit judicial deference under Chevron, a court reviewing
the FDA's reinterpretation of the statutory language at issue in Young
should be only as deferential to the reinterpretation as it would be had the
Young interpretation been fashioned by a court rather than by the FDA. 16
Finally, the fact that Chevron deference typically is only
"substantive" explains why courts should be especially hesitant to defer to
an agency's reinterpretation of its governing statute, especially where a
court has ratified the agency's prior view. Simply put, the principle of stare
decisis-arguably no less foundational than the express provisions of
160 Chevron deference is thus like the doctrine of primary jurisdiction stripped of the
procedural deference characteristic of deference to another adjudicative body.
161 In Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,130-31 (1990), the Court held
that deference to a reinterpretation depended on whether the prior interpretation had been deferred to or
had been reviewed de novo by the court. Under the interpretation of Chevron advanced here, "review"
by the prior court should be understood to include all prior judicial deference except deference to
legislative, gap-filling rules.
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Article lII62-applies where courts defer to agency rules that are
interpretative or that do not fill gaps in the same way it applies to courts
engaged in de novo review. Although that principle does not bar a court
from overruling prior adjudication, it does place substantial limits on
judicial "reinterpretation." These limits are inconsistent with a blanket rule
of deference to reasonable interpretations. Absent unusual circumstances,
it is only for the legislature or one of its delegates to change law through
new enactment. Judicial overruling of prior decisions is an extraordinary
measure reserved for instances in which a patently unjust, undesired, or
unforeseen outcome justifies a change of course, and legislative action
cannot timely respond to the difficulty. 61 Since deference typically
involves the same exercise of judicial authority as does scrutiny de novo,
courts are no more free to ignore the restraints on their power when they
defer than when they do not. Thus, while a proper reading of Chevron
might support the Court's deference to the EPA's reinterpretation in
Chevron, such a reading cannot support the Court's deference in Rust-at
least not without an independent inquiry into whether there existed
conditions supporting an overturning of precedent. Rust, after all,
presented a reinterpretation of settled law concerning the meaning of
"method of family planning." Had the Court rather than HHS initially
determined that term's meaning in 1971, it is unlikely that the Court would
have been willing to revisit and overrule that interpretation twenty years
later. One is hard pressed to assume that such factors as the permissibility
of HHS's new construction of the statute or the fact that the new
construction now appeared to be a "better" interpretation would have
outweighed the strong policy in favor of upholding prior judicial
interpretations.'64 Notwithstanding the cogency of these arguments, the
effect of Rust is to achieve precisely the same result-a diminution of the
power of precedent and a consequent increase in unauthorized and non-
accountable agency legislation.
III. Policy
Up to this point, the argument in favor of a narrow reading of
Chevron has rested on the premise that Chevron must remain within
existing constitutional and statutory limits on agency power. But one
162 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1005-06; see also id. at 1006 n.152 ("There can be no doubt
that the Framers of the Constitution understood that the norm of following precedent was an integral
element of the functioning of courts.").
163 See generally GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 162-69
(1982) (discussing circumstances in which judicial overruling of statutes is permissible); RONALD
DWORmIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 244 (1986) (arguing courts possess power to overturn existing law on the
basis of principle, not policy).
164 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1991).
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might just as easily read Chevron as a partial rethinking of either or both of
these limits in light of the exigencies of the modem bureaucratic state. In
that event, the evaluation of Chevron would turn not upon its
incompatibility with existing doctrine, but instead upon the question of
whether the circumstances of modem governance supported Chevron's
revision of longstanding principles of legislative delegation and separation
of powers.
A number of commentators have argued that Chevron does effect a
break with prior doctrine and that this break indeed represents an advance
over that doctrine. 65 Professor Weaver contends that considerations of
agency expertise and flexibility favor administrative rather than judicial
interpretation of ambiguous or silent governing statutes. 66  Other
commentators ground the policy of deference in agencies' greater political
accountability. For example, Kenneth Starr has argued that because
Chevron deference typically involves the settlement of policy questions,
"democratically accountable officials" rather than unelected judges should
interpret ambiguous statutes.167 Indeed, Starr goes so far as to suggest that
Chevron's transfer of policy oriented questions to agency decision-makers
does not undermine the separation of powers, but actually furthers it: Since
policy setting is the province of the political branches, they, rather than the
courts, should shoulder responsibility for resolving questions that bare
interpretation of statutory language cannot.
68
A closer analysis of deference to interpretation suggests, however,
that its disadvantages often outweigh its benefits. While agency
rulemaking may emphasize such factors as technical expertise, flexibility,
and political accountability, it lacks the features of concreteness,
independence, and interpretive expertise that mark judicial resolution of a
fact-bound, individualized controversy. These attributes of judicial
resolution do not decisively weigh in favor of de novo review, but they do
weigh against any policy that decisively rules it out. Indeed, it is the
variability of the factors supporting deference that suggests that Chevron's
all-or-nothing approach to agency rulemaking review is inappropriate. 69
165 See supra notes 163-164.
166 Faced with a "choice between competing interpretative alternatives" concerning a "policy
choice, . . . there are compelling reasons to allow the responsible agency to make that choice. Its
expertise, and its authority, give it a greater claim of authority." Weaver, supra note 17, at 558.
167 Starr, supra note 62, at 312.
168 See id. at 308. See also Pierce, supra note 17, at 2229 ("[Tlhe Court [in Chevron]
recognized that the process of adopting a construction of an ambiguous statute is the process of
resolving a policy dispute."). Other commentators arguing for an expansive reading of Chevron
include Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
569 (1985); and Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-86 (1988).
169 See Recommendations and Statement of the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) Regarding Practice and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,972-73 (1989) (recommending
judicial deference to agencies' legislative rules but stricter scrutiny of agencies' interpretative rules,
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More importantly, this variability indicates the fundamentally judicial
nature of most instances of deference under Chevron. Where an agency
does not fill a gap, its activity is genuinely one of interpretation. But the
relative capacity of different institutions to engage in interpretation is
contextually variable. A rule that assigns that task to one body whenever a
circumscribed set of conditions is met ignores the context-sensitive nature
of the inquiry that must be made in order to determine who is best able to
fashion a rule giving effect to statutory purposes. I suspect that much of
the reported non-compliance with Chevron takes place in just those cases
in which courts sense a particularly pressing need for a context-sensitive
inquiry but where Chevron precludes the inquiry.
170
Moreover, the factors relied upon by Chevron to support the
presumption in favor of agency interpretations are themselves suspect
where Chevron provides a rule of statutory interpretation rather than
presumed legislative delegation. Justice Stevens identified as one of
Chevron's principal justifications the fact that agencies are accountable but
courts are not.' 71 Whereas courts are not permitted to reach decisions "on
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences," an agency "may,
within the limits of [congressionally delegated policymaking
responsibilities], properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views
of wise policy to inform its judgments.' 72
As applied to agency interpretations, this reasoning is ill considered.
Recall that where an agency resolves ambiguity, it provides meaning to
statutory language and does not act on a mandate to legislate. But the
meaning of language is not determined by the extent to which an agency
must be responsive to political forces; it is determined through a
consideration of statutory language, policy, and more generally the sorts of
factors courts typically look to when they interpret statutes.' 73 At most, an
agency can aid in the analysis of these matters by virtue of its knowledge
of these factors; an agency does not further the effort to ascertain meaning
by making the interpretive process itself the subject of political debate. By
joining the effort to subject all decision-making to the political process,
Chevron forgets that the task of interpretation is one for the judiciary, one
of the virtues of which is that it is shielded from popular will. If political
accountability is permitted to form the basis of interpretation, it is likely
that policy has invaded the interpretive process; it is likely, that is, that
guidelines, and other informal rules).
170 The argument suggests that court decisions are more likely to fail to cite or properly
follow Chevron when the agency rule interprets statutory ambiguity than when it fills a legislative gap.
171 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
172 Id.
173 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987) (discussing models of statutory interpretation generally applied by courts).
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legislation is taking place under the guise of interpretation.
The effects of surreptitious agency policymaking are especially
pernicious in the case of agency reinterpretation, as Rust itself indicates. I
suggested earlier that had Rust involved review of a judicial interpretation,
the Court would have been much more hard pressed to overrule that
interpretation. Comparing the effects of Rust to those of that hypothetical
case, it becomes apparent why a judicial willingness to overturn precedent
is more likely to subvert than to advance political accountability. Had Rust
come out the other way, Congress could have changed the HHS rule
through amending legislation only. Congress thus would have had to
answer for legislation that it clearly considered to be controversial. One
might counter that Congress could have given HHS this authority anyway
merely by leaving a gap in the PHSA. But at a minimum such authority
would have placed the public on notice of Congress's decision to delegate
a politically sensitive issue to another body-if not when the legislation
was passed, then at least when the agency first promulgated a rule to fill
the gap. One also might argue that HITS could have provided the 1991
interpretation in 1971. Since such an interpretation would have been
permissible under Chevron as an instance of independent judicial
deference, it is not clear why the same result after a prior interpretation is
impermissible. But this argument fails to recognize that the problem is the
reversal of the policy, not the policy itself. That reversal upsets settled
expectations about the meaning of the statute and calls into question the
actual statutory meaning. In contrast to the first rule, which the agency
promulgates against the backdrop of statutory ambiguity, a
"reinterpretation" of previously clarified language reverses course where
there is no reason to assume a change of course is necessary. It is one thing
to give a meaning to statutory language that lacks a meaning; it is another
to give statutory language meaning and then say the meaning is in fact
different.
Conclusion
Chevron establishes a formal test for the validity of agency rules,
although a substantive one focusing on the circumstances of rulemaking
should apply. The test is formal in that validity does not depend on
whether it is a good idea for the court to defer to the rule, but on whether
Congress has satisfied, implicitly or otherwise, the conditions for a valid
delegation and the agency has promulgated a legislative rule in accordance
with statutory requirements. That Chevron establishes a formal inquiry is
not surprising given the Court's tacit conceptualization of agency rules as
emanating from Congress's implied delegation of legislative authority. In
any such case, the question of whether deference is a good idea rests with
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Congress-with its decision in the first place whether or not to delegate-
not with the courts.
The Chevron inquiry is misplaced, however, because agency
interpretation in the non-gap-filling case is by its nature a judicial activity,
regardless of whether Congress and the agency have satisfied the
procedural requirements for delegation and legislative rulemaking,
respectively. For this reason, the existence of the agency's authority to
interpret statutory ambiguity can and should be a substantive one for the
court, just as the decision to delegate genuine legislative authority is a
substantive one for Congress. In both instances, the question is not one of
agency authority, but of agency competence. In the case of administrative
interpretation, the answer to this question depends on the individualized
circumstances of agency rulemaking; it depends on the inherently variable
factors that Chevron requires reviewing courts to disregard.
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